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1. Introduction 
Political leadership analysis affords valuable insights in-
to the key actors who have changed the trajectories of 
contemporary societies, and studies of US presidents 
and prime ministers in Westminster systems constitute 
particularly fertile fields for scholars to plough (for a 
sample see: Bennister, 2012; Blick & Jones, 2014; Fo-
ley, 2000; Greenstein, 1988, 2009; Heffernan, 2005; 
Hennessy, 2000; McKay, 2014; Neustadt, 1960, 1980; 
Weller, 2014). Parliament, by contrast, appears to offer 
a less compelling area of study from a leadership per-
spective, because, in party-dominated Westminster style 
systems, the dynamics and interactions that determine 
parliamentary outcomes are rarely easily distilled into 
explanations focused exclusively around individuals. 
However, leadership as a political function is not con-
fined to executive politics, and is necessarily dispersed in 
any system of democratic governance, yet parliamentary 
analyses of political leadership are in relatively short 
supply. While the definitive guide to the topic, The Ox-
ford Handbook of Political Leadership (Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 
2014a), includes four chapters on prime ministerial 
leadership, and six on forms of ‘political leadership at 
work’, it offers no perspective on parliamentary political 
leadership. Although leadership analyses have been ap-
plied to the arena of legislative politics (for a review, see 
Norton, 2012), and many studies have been conducted 
on US legislative leadership (e.g. Caro, 2002; Cooper & 
Brady, 1981; Herrnson, 1998; Jewell & Whicker, 1994; 
Peabody, 1976, 1985; Peters, 1990; Smith, 2007; Smith 
& Deering, 1984; Strahan, 2007, 2011), the UK parlia-
ment has not been subject to any such exploration. Con-
sequently, this article poses the following question: can 
concepts of political leadership be usefully applied to 
the analysis of the UK Parliament?  
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 115-126 116 
Recent institutional developments at Westminster 
make this question especially compelling. The House of 
Commons departmental select committee system has 
become the key vehicle through which in-depth, non-
legislative executive scrutiny is delivered by MPs. The 
system’s scrutiny capacity has recently expanded, par-
ticularly through the role of the committee chairs, who 
have, since 2010, been directly elected by the whole 
House, and who thus now possess a range of demo-
cratic resources which they did not previously enjoy. As 
membership of Commons select committees is re-
stricted to backbench MPs, they offer a valuable op-
portunity to examine whether political leadership is a 
useful conceptual lens through which to analyse the 
activities of the chairs who sit at their apex, and thus 
whether political leadership can be observed in the 
House of Commons beyond that exercised by the par-
liamentary party leaderships. This article consequently 
breaks new ground by analysing the UK Parliament’s 
House of Commons select committees through the lens 
of political leadership.  
The article proceeds in three parts. It begins by ex-
ploring relevant insights from the political leadership 
literature, particularly debates about leadership and 
followership, and concepts of collaborative leadership. 
The article then sketches the institutional context in 
which select committees and their chairs operate, and 
the implications for a conceptualisation of chairs in 
terms of political leadership. Finally, the article anal-
yses interview data gathered from select committee 
chairs between 2011–2012, which explicitly probes the 
beliefs and understandings of chairs about their role 
and the extent to which it is one which encompasses 
leadership. The article advances two key arguments: 
first, that the political leadership approach is of signifi-
cant conceptual value for the analysis of House of 
Commons select committees; and, second, that those 
who are actually ‘doing’ leadership can provide us with 
extraordinarily useful insights into everyday leadership 
practices, which in turn expands our understanding of 
what political leadership entails for those charged with 
performing it. 
2. Political Leadership: Concepts and Themes 
Leadership research seeks to answer two key questions 
which are central to this article: what is leadership, and 
how do we know it when we see it? (Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 
2014b, p. 3). If leadership involves someone influencing 
a group of individuals to achieve a common goal 
(Northouse, 2010, p. 3), then this raises questions 
about the method of influence, how common goals are 
defined, and how consent both constrains and ani-
mates leadership across the diverse democratic plat-
forms through which it is exercised, including the par-
liamentary committee platform which forms the focus 
of this inquiry. Political and organizational cultures are 
consequently crucial to understanding the operation 
and consequences of leadership. Burns (1978, p. 425) 
defines leadership as ‘the reciprocal process of mobiliz-
ing, by persons with certain motives and values, vari-
ous economic, political, and other resources, in a con-
text of competition and conflict, in order to realise 
goals independently or mutually held by both leaders 
and followers.’ This definition advances understanding 
in two key ways: first, by qualifying ‘leader-centric’ ac-
counts which focus largely on the actions of individuals 
in leadership positions; and second, by drawing into 
the analysis those whom leaders seek to lead as well as 
the context in which such leadership occurs. We need 
to understand not just the motivations of leaders, but 
the motivations of those who follow, which is highly 
significant for the questions explored in this article. Po-
litical leaders derive their authority not just from the 
democratic procedural arrangements through which 
they ascend to the top of organizational structures, but 
also from the ‘processual’ mechanisms through which 
leaders engage in exchange relationships with other 
actors (Hartley & Benington, 2011, p. 207), and the de-
gree of trust placed in leaders by followers delimits the 
bounds of democratic political leadership (Ruscio, 
2004), which necessarily springs from consent (Kane & 
Patapan, 2012). Two interrelated themes thus frame 
the parliamentary analysis pursued here: first, the dis-
tinctions between and debates about leadership and 
followership; and, second, the concept of collaborative 
leadership and the centrality of soft and smart power 
to its effectiveness. 
2.1. Leadership and Followership 
Contemporary scholarship explores leadership ‘as an 
interactive process between leaders and followers; in-
stitutions and the rules of the game; and the broader 
historical context’ (Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 2014b, p. 6). 
Leadership is not simply a matter of ‘a leader acting 
and a group of followers responding in a mechanical 
way’, but is instead a highly complex social process in 
which the organizational cultural context is fundamen-
tal in shaping interactions (Alvesson, 2011, p. 152). It is 
impossible to understand leaders without understand-
ing those they seek to lead, and the environment in 
which such leadership occurs, and follower-centric ap-
proaches to leadership analysis have largely eschewed 
individualistic and ‘heroic’ approaches (Meindl, 1990, 
1995). If the term ‘followership’ is controversial, such 
controversy is itself emblematic of the need to under-
stand leaders and followers in relation to each other, 
and to their organizational and social environments. 
Successful leaders are those who ‘succeed in appealing 
to, embodying or modifying the social identities of 
their followers’ (Rhodes & ‘t Hart. 2014b, p. 6). Crucial-
ly, as leadership involves ‘leaders inducing followers to 
act for certain goals that represent the values and the 
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motivations…of both leaders and followers’, the ‘genius 
of leadership’ therefore involves drawing actors to-
gether ‘in pursuit of a common or at least joint pur-
pose’ (Burns, 1978, p. 19). 
Yet, the terms ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ have differ-
ent meanings in different contexts, and organizational 
culture will significantly determine whether actors 
even acknowledge them as meaningful to their regular 
interactions. While in some organizations, the lead-
er/follower distinction will be clear and accepted ter-
minology, in others these definitions and their applica-
bility will be open to debate. In particular, the identity, 
motivations and values of so-called followers will shape 
leader-follower relations, hence why it is crucial to ana-
lyse the ‘proverbial ‘other side’ of the leadership coin’ 
(Bligh, 2011, p. 426). Context will at least in part de-
termine whether actors in a political organization are 
agreeable to the leader-follower distinction, not least 
because those who are already members of the politi-
cal elite may balk at the notion of contexts in which 
they are defined as followers.  
Yet although there is debate about the use of the 
term ‘follower’ (Burns, 2005; Rost, 2008), the term is not 
in itself necessarily derogatory. Baker (2007) demon-
strates that both leaders and followers are roles rather 
than individual characteristics; that followers are active 
rather than passive; and that leaders and followers share 
common purposes rather than the former imposing 
purpose on the latter. Similarly, work on relational lead-
ership theory (Uhl-Bien, 2006), leadership complexity 
theory (Uhl-Bien, Marion, & McKelvey, 2007), and dis-
tributed leadership (Gronn, 2002) have sought to treat 
leadership as an ‘interactive dynamic relationship be-
tween organizational actors from which adaptive out-
comes emerge’ and which emphasize the importance of 
‘interdependence, coordination and…reciprocal influ-
ence’ (Bligh, 2011, p. 427). Followership research has 
demonstrated that it has multiple meanings, and that 
followers construct those meanings not just in relation 
to their own individual perceptions, but also in relation 
to their organizational context and to the leaders with 
whom they interact (Carsten, Uhl-Bein, West, Patera, & 
McGregor, 2010). Heifetz, Grashow and Linksy’s (2009) 
analysis of adaptive leadership is particularly useful in 
understanding group dynamics and the crucial leader-
ship skill of empowering groups to deal with issues and 
challenges in relation to the group’s context, rather than 
the leader simply dictating action from above (‘t Hart, 
2014, p. 105). These insights allow us to conceive of 
leadership and followership as necessarily imbued with 
‘multiple, shifting, contradictory and ambiguous identi-
ties’ (Collinson, 2005, p. 1436) which reflect the dynam-
ics of the organizational terrain in which they operate. 
Finally, the idea of leadership as a distributed resource 
which is shared with followers is crucial to understand-
ing its conceptual utility in the specific parliamentary 
context which forms the analytical focus of this article. 
2.2. Collaborative Leadership and Leadership Resources 
To the extent that modern democratic governance 
takes place through ‘leadership constellations’ (Hen-
driks & Karsten, 2014, p. 52) and networks of interde-
pendent actors (Rhodes, 1997), and to the extent that 
the complexity of modern societies compels the rejec-
tion of institutionalised hierarchy and the embrace of 
collaborative governance (‘t Hart, 2014, p. 88), then ef-
fective political leadership consequently requires nego-
tiation with stakeholders, and the capability to bind 
stakeholders together through various interaction pro-
cesses in the pursuit of common endeavours (Klijn, 
2014, p. 404). Goal alignments between leaders and 
followers arise only through complex interaction pro-
cesses designed to manage actors’ strategic behaviours 
(Klijn, 2014, p. 406). Iterative collaboration is therefore 
fundamental for democratic governance (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008), and successful political leaders facilitate 
collaboration between participants through processes 
of negotiation and, crucially, by securing agreement 
about the end goals of collaboration. Collaborative 
leadership thus involves relationship-building between 
actors who may otherwise have no obvious motivation 
to work together, and, because leaders must mobilise 
actors, they must also understand ‘other actors’ per-
ceptions and desires about the problems and the solu-
tions’ which they are tackling (Klijn, 2014, p. 408). 
These key insights from collaborative leadership ap-
proaches are fundamental in framing our analysis of 
the political leadership that can be observed inside 
Commons select committees, a point upon which we 
will expand shortly. 
Collaborative leadership approaches sketch the 
type of political leadership that is likely to be found in-
side parliamentary committee environments, and con-
sequently also point to the sort of leadership tools that 
we might observe in use. Here, Nye’s (2008) distinc-
tions between ‘soft’, ‘hard’ and ‘smart’ power are use-
ful in mapping the resources that are available to select 
committee chairs, and the skills they are required to 
deploy. Soft power involves emotional intelligence in 
order to manage relationships, strong communication 
skills across different audiences, and the ability to ar-
ticulate a vision which is attractive to diverse stake-
holders while still advancing group goals. Hard power 
involves organisational skills and the management of 
information flows, as well as the more Machiavellian 
skills of strategic negotiation and bargaining. Smart 
power involves combining soft and hard power re-
sources, in order to understand how changing institu-
tional environments affect the group, to capitalise on 
emerging trends, and to adjust leadership style in rela-
tion to the needs of followers (Nye, 2008, p. 83). As 
Blondel (2014, p. 714) notes, smart power also involves 
leaders being prepared ‘to examine the views of oth-
ers’ and ‘rethink and assess what is being proposed as 
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a result of objections raised’. Smart leadership there-
fore involves persuasion but also compromise. This is 
of crucial significance in understanding the extent to 
which political leadership is a meaningful category in 
the analysis of parliamentary select committees. 
The political leadership literature therefore offers 
key analytical angles that can help us understand the 
role, capacity and action of parliamentary committee 
chairs. These actors have not yet been examined from 
a political leadership perspective, yet debates about 
leadership and followership, the dynamics of collabora-
tive leadership, and the soft, hard and smart power re-
sources which are available to leadership actors all 
provide valuable analytical leverage. The next section 
explores the House of Commons select committee con-
text in order to demonstrate this analytical utility and 
the extent to which committee chairs can be consid-
ered as political leaders. 
3. House of Commons Select Committees: Political 
Leadership Context and Contingencies 
In the UK’s asymmetrical political system, the re-
sources of the executive significantly outstrip those of 
parliament and the MPs tasked with holding govern-
ment to account (Judge, 1993; Norton, 2013). Commit-
tee-based infrastructure is designed as a partial reme-
dy to this power asymmetry. It imbues groups of MPs 
with the capacity to pursue executive scrutiny away 
from the floor of the chamber in a way that both 
dampens MPs’ partisan instincts and enhances their in-
terrogatory capacity vis-à-vis executive actors. House 
of Commons departmental select committees shadow 
government departments, investigate departmental 
policy, administration and expenditure, and examine 
the work of associated agencies and public bodies. 
These committees are largely viewed as making a posi-
tive contribution to government scrutiny, albeit with 
qualifications (e.g. Drewry, 1985; Giddings, 1985, 1994; 
Hindmoor, Larkin, & Kennon, 2009; Judge, 1992; Rus-
sell & Benton, 2011). They inquire into policy issues, 
take evidence from a range of actors and stakeholders 
including government ministers, and publish recom-
mendations for policy and operational improvement, 
many of which are adopted by government (Russell & 
Benton, 2011). Through their inquiries, select commit-
tees provide a public arena, or ‘theatre of action’ (Uhr 
& Wanna, 2000), through which government actors 
may be interrogated, evidence presented and queried, 
and arguments articulated regarding the focus and im-
pact of public policy and executive decision making. 
The Liaison Committee, the committee on which all se-
lect committee chairs sit, contributes to this work by 
taking evidence on a regular basis from the prime min-
ister, which constitutes a significant innovation in par-
liamentary committee scrutiny (Kelso, Bennister, & 
Larkin, in press). Select committees have also become 
increasingly visible actors in the news media, because 
committees’ cross-party character and in-depth inves-
tigatory approaches are perceived to render critical in-
quiry conclusions relatively authoritative. There are 
four key points to delineate in terms of the operation 
and organisation of select committees that together 
demonstrate the value of the political leadership ana-
lytical lens sketched above. 
First, the development and evolution of the select 
committee system since its creation in 1979 has im-
bued the chair role with the potential for political lead-
ership and parliamentary authority. Organisational re-
forms have progressively delimited the ability of 
frontbench party business managers and whips to de-
termine committee memberships and thus constrain 
capacity for action. In 2001, government backbench 
MPs refused to authorise the slate of new committee 
members in protest against what was perceived to be 
the malign influence of party whips in the membership 
selection process, which prompted internal party 
changes to membership nomination procedures (Kelso, 
2003, 2009a). In 2009, those in favour of a more vigor-
ous select committee system capitalised on the tumult 
caused by the MPs expenses scandal to successfully se-
cure an overhaul of committee membership processes 
(Kelso, 2009b; Russell, 2011). Since 2010, select com-
mittees have been appointed under rules which involve 
the entire House of Commons electing MPs to the se-
lect committee chairs. MPs run for election for the 
chair positions available to their party (the number of 
chairs assigned to parties is in proportion to seat 
share), and must attract support from across the par-
ties to get onto the ballot. With committee chairs no 
longer arguably in the gift of the party whips, and with 
MPs compelled to secure cross-party support in order 
to be elected to the chair, this development in select 
committee organization has had clear consequences 
for the perceived legitimacy of chairs and also for their 
agency and capacity for action. To the extent that 
chairs can utilise the political capital derived from their 
electoral legitimacy for particular political and/or or-
ganizational ends, and can use it in a way which ad-
vances committee goals and shapes the behaviour of 
other committee members, then leadership of some 
form is in evidence. If select committee chairs are im-
bued with authority and leadership potential because of 
their direct election by MPs, then the key question is 
how that potential is actually used. To what extent is the 
enhanced political capital of chairship being converted 
into the powerful political currency of leadership?  
Second, the operational context in which chairs 
function demonstrates the necessity of effective lead-
ership. Select committees have formal powers to call 
witnesses to give evidence, and to request information 
and documents from relevant stakeholders in order to 
run their inquiries. They produce inquiry reports which 
detail what the committee discovered, the conclusions 
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it drew, and the recommendations it makes to specific 
policy actors. These activities require coordination 
from the chair, but the role extends beyond simple 
process management. Chairs must secure agreement 
from members about committee policy agendas, in-
quiry focus, and report arguments, none of which 
would otherwise spring organically from a group of 
MPs from different political parties. The process man-
agement of select committee work is only meaningful if 
the committee has already agreed on its goals. While 
the generic goal is that of executive scrutiny, the spe-
cific goals will vary from inquiry to inquiry, and chairs 
must be skilled at navigating the competing goals of 
MPs from different parties in relation to different top-
ics of policy inquiry. This work necessarily involves col-
laborative political leadership, because the institutional 
committee context and the nature of committee mem-
bership means that chairs cannot adopt command-and-
control approaches to agenda setting and inquiry goal-
identification and expect members to go along with it. 
Goal alignments (Klijn, 2014) and iterative collabora-
tion (Ansell & Gash, 2008) amongst members are es-
sential, and both depend on at least a minimal level of 
relationship-building amongst individuals from different 
party backgrounds in order to enable participants to un-
derstand issues from the perspective of others (Klijn, 
2014, p. 408). This is a function that only committee 
chairs are institutionally positioned to perform. 
Third, while select committees are cross-party, this 
does not make them non-party. Chairs must navigate 
the party loyalties and preferences of members in a 
way that maintains committee consensus while still fa-
cilitating the expression of divergent views from mem-
bers about the need to be critical of government. This 
is a crucial point, because select committees reflect 
party seat share, and therefore have an in-build gov-
ernment majority. Although their cross-party member-
ship means that select committees generally focus on 
the operational detail of policy when they examine di-
visive matters, the question of whether and how to 
criticise government policy and decision making will 
naturally present challenges for committee MPs. Select 
committee scrutiny of government, and its policies and 
decision making, can only be maximized if members 
operate mostly consensually for most of the time. Con-
sequently, MPs on the government side may be hesi-
tant about endorsing strenuous critiques, while opposi-
tion MPs may seek just the kind of full-throated 
savaging that is likely to make the committee majority 
balk. While a degree of partisan self-constraint 
amongst members is likely, given the fundamental task 
of the select committee system, whoever sits in the 
committee chair must nevertheless ensure that con-
sensual working is achieved amid these competing ob-
jectives, because otherwise the purpose of the select 
committee is defeated. It is in managing the potentially 
conflicting demands of committee MPs, and in forging 
agreed goals from a mix of competing individual moti-
vations, that the chair role transcends administrative 
coordination and becomes a vehicle for collaborative po-
litical leadership. Chairs must navigate the partisan in-
stincts of committee MPs, ensure committee minorities 
are not routinely thwarted, and avoid offending MPs’ 
highly independent and fiercely autonomous sensibili-
ties. Collaborative leadership is clearly essential for gen-
erating the consensual outputs which underpin commit-
tee contributions to democratic governance, and 
requires chairs to deploy a mix of soft, hard and smart 
skills in order to both agree and secure committee goals.  
Fourth, and emerging from the previous points, the 
leader/follower dynamic is highly germane in the select 
committee context. The committee chair is integral to 
a select committee ‘team’ that is ‘composed of mem-
bers who are interdependent, who share common 
goals, and who must coordinate their activities to ac-
complish these goals’ (Kogler-Hill, 2010, p. 241). The 
institutional position of select committees as consen-
sual groups embedded in an inherently partisan organ-
izational environment requires the deft navigation of 
the parameters of followership inside the select com-
mittee environment. In fact, the parliamentary arena is 
a remarkably useful place to probe what followership 
actually means in the context of democratic collabora-
tive governance amongst elites. Members’ party loyalty 
will largely take precedence over the strategic goals of 
the committee, and chairs must operate with a situa-
tional ‘mental model’ which is sensitive to the ‘contin-
gencies that define the larger context of team action’ 
(Kogler-Hill, 2010, p. 243). If ‘organizational cultures 
provide actors with sets of beliefs about the nature and 
role of leadership’ (Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 2014b, p. 6), then 
effective chairs are those who understand the con-
straints on, and limits to, a committee’s scrutiny capac-
ity as defined both by the specific parliamentary con-
text and the broader political environment in which the 
committee operates. Organizational culture is para-
mount, and leadership requires a willingness not only 
to acknowledge the limitations created by that culture 
but also to generate adaptive responses to it (Shein, 
1992, p. 2), and to the various motivations of commit-
tee members, in order to advance committee goals. Se-
lect committee chairs are therefore ‘interactive lead-
ers’ (Burns, 1978, p. 15). Furthermore, leadership is 
necessarily distributed and shared, because committee 
chairs operate in a context in which group members al-
ready enjoy an elite status, and in which the cross-
party organizational dynamic renders notions of ‘fol-
lowership’ difficult to sustain.  
To summarise, the increasing importance of select 
committees and their scrutiny work to effective par-
liamentary functioning, the institutionally elevated po-
sition of committee chairs as a consequence of House 
of Commons election, and the complexities of commit-
tee operation all demonstrate the requirement for in-
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tentional political leadership inside select committees. 
The tensions inherent in leadership and followership 
are directly relevant to select committee environments 
where members are highly autonomous political elites, 
while the concept of collaborative leadership usefully 
frames the type of leadership that chairs might pursue 
in order to secure member support of committee 
goals. The value of the political leadership perspective 
is borne out in interviews conducted with select com-
mittee chairs, as the next section demonstrates. 
4. Perceptions of Leadership amongst Committee 
Chairs 
What do chairs themselves think about their commit-
tee roles? What are their beliefs and understandings 
about their work, about their relationships with other 
committee members, and about the strategies they 
adopt in order to discharge committee tasks? Do chairs 
see their role as one of leadership? These questions 
framed a series of interviews conducted with select 
committee chairs, during 2011–2012. There were eight 
interviews in total, which included chairs from all three 
of the UK parliamentary parties which were assigned 
chair positions in the 2010 parliament (Conservative 
(2), Liberal Democrat (2), and Labour (4)), in which the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats ran a coalition 
government, and Labour was the official opposition 
party. The findings from the interviews are explored in 
the context of the key themes of collaborative leader-
ship, leadership and followership, and in the context of 
the leadership resources deployed by chairs in relation 
to Nye’s (2008) soft, hard and smart power categories. 
4.1. Collaborative Leadership and Committee Practice 
The interview evidence strongly suggests that the con-
cept of collaborative leadership is highly applicable to 
the select committee context, and recognisable in the 
actions of chairs. One committee chair perfectly ex-
pressed the need for collaborative leadership when she 
remarked, ‘So, you are looking to see how we turn a 
group of disparate, strong-willed individuals into a pack 
animal?’ (interview, July 6, 2011). Her view was that 
most ‘outsiders’ failed to understand this essential 
metamorphosis which had to happen for committees 
to work even at a minimal level, and that relationship 
building amongst members was crucial. This necessari-
ly took time, and did not just ‘magically occur’ at the 
start of a new parliament, but she insisted that ‘they do 
start to hunt as a pack, despite the fact that they’re 
from different political perspectives—it does happen.’ 
The extent to which this transformation occurred was 
due, in her view, in no small part to the leadership ca-
pacity and activity of the chair in deliberately ‘breaking 
down that resistance’. In order to do this, a range of 
leadership resources must be deployed, and it was 
those of Nye’s (2008) soft and smart variety which fea-
tured most prominently in chair responses.  
For example, this same chair explained that a key 
step towards achieving this ‘breaking down of re-
sistance’ involved the committee travelling overseas on 
a fact-finding trip as part of an inquiry launched early in 
the new parliament. ‘Those who went on that trip’, she 
argued, ‘came back as a more coherent group’ (inter-
view, July 6, 2011). And not all trips had to be exotic: 
this chair also noted the utility of UK-based fact-finding 
trips, and meetings with members of the public away 
from Westminster, as key to building a ‘team ethos’ 
around a policy focus and dampening partisan in-
stincts. In fact, several chairs reported the usefulness 
of away days and trips out of Westminster for building 
collegiality amongst committee members who might 
otherwise regard one another’s motivations warily. Be-
ing removed from the physical environment of West-
minster, with its oppositional politics and oppositional 
spaces, and traveling and eating together for sustained 
periods of time, enabled MPs to share their common 
interests in terms of the policy focus of the committee. 
Astute committee chairs used these opportunities as 
key leadership tools to help build the collegiality that 
was required for their committees to function effective-
ly. These trips may have been organised for instrumental 
inquiry purposes, but they also enabled chairs to deploy 
the soft skills required for relationship building. 
Clearly, fact-finding trips go only so far, and much 
rests on the chair’s capacity to foster and sustain colle-
giality in the longer term. One chair explained that, 
‘one of the skills that a chair needs is an ability to oper-
ate in a collegiate manner, because select committee 
reports are pretty useless if they are divided’ (inter-
view, July 4, 2011). He argued that chairs were re-
quired to understand ‘that there are some political 
boundaries you will not be able to cross’ when it comes 
to shifting the political positions of both government 
and opposition MPs on committees, and that chairs 
had to handle the processes of compromise. These 
skills were particularly crucial for report drafting, which 
the interviewees identified as a key moment in the 
work of a committee. Inquiry reports are the most im-
portant outputs generated by committees, and the 
main vehicle through which they articulate arguments 
about government policy, decision making, and admin-
istration. It is essential that committees produce con-
sensus reports, because split committees with majority 
and minority reports are entirely at odds with the pur-
pose of the system. Engineering consensus at the point 
of report drafting, in terms of agreeing the line of ar-
gument and the nature of any criticisms dispensed, is 
therefore crucial. Consequently, chair leadership in-
volved not only the soft skill of accurately identifying 
when members had reached the boundaries of consen-
sus; it also involved the hard power of bargaining with 
members in order to identify the optimum compromise 
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arrangement which still enabled the production of ro-
bust inquiry reports.  
On this point, an opposition party chair spoke at 
length about her role in facilitating compromise 
through negotiation, noting that it was important for 
her to spot partisan clashes in advance of committee 
meetings, and to work out ‘what the lines might be as 
to how far you can push, and who will accept what, in 
terms of getting the compromise’ (interview, July 6, 
2011). Crucially, her strategy eschewed dealing with 
conflict through private meetings: 
‘I don’t want the committee to think that I’m set-
ting up cabals…because if I start to do that, they 
would start to do that…I’m trying to build a cohe-
sive group of people who will come up with sensi-
ble suggestions that government might enact. And 
if I start playing one off against the other…well, the 
last thing I would want to do is to undermine that 
sense of the collective.’ (interview, July 6, 2011) 
Compromise was instead engineered in full committee 
where everyone could have their say. For example, one 
chair explained the need to ensure that any MPs who 
‘have expressed doubts…have the opportunity to ex-
plore those doubts as part of the investigatory process’ 
(interview, July 4, 2011). Particularly notable is that 
most chairs reported using the skills of the committee 
clerks to help produce report language that all mem-
bers could live with. Thus, compromises often involved 
the use of what one chair described as ‘carefully cho-
sen language’ to ensure that the final committee re-
ports did not ‘simply provoke’ controversy (interview, 
December 4, 2012), but constructively identified key 
failings in policy, decision making or implementation in 
a manner that respected the consensual committee 
style. Chairs consequently lead not by individual heroic 
efforts in brokering agreements, but by making the en-
tire committee responsible for securing consensus and 
drawing on all skill sets available to maximise success, 
including those of committee clerks who typically have 
far more experience of the practicalities of report 
drafting than do committee members. Clearly, collabo-
rative and dispersed leadership is in evidence. Thus, 
although committee chairs are elected, their democrat-
ic legitimacy does not allow them to impose solutions 
on divided committees, precisely because of the fol-
lowership dynamics mapped earlier. Instead, chairs are 
compelled to draw on a range of institutional re-
sources, and soft, hard and smart power strategies, in 
order to secure successful outcomes. 
There are additional contingencies, one of which is 
that challenges associated with committee leadership 
differ depending on whether the chair is a member of 
the party of government or opposition. An opposition 
party chair explained that his role was different to that 
of a government party chair: 
‘where it’s much easier [for the chair] to carry his 
own point of view, because he’s always got a ma-
jority. Again though, he’s got to handle dealing with 
the minority, and making sure that he gets buy-in 
from there. I’ve got a slightly different problem, in 
that the minority are more likely to share my view 
on a Political-with-a-capital-P issue, but I’ve got to 
get buy-in from the majority …So there are differ-
ent skills required in trying to maintain the momen-
tum of the team.’ (interview, July 4, 2011) 
Similarly, while chairs may be highly active when it 
comes to private committee meetings where inquiry 
reports are being agreed, their activism may be less no-
ticeable during committee oral evidence sessions. One 
chair explained that the allocation of questions for 
such sessions will be determined in advance, and that 
while his role involved asking the opening set of ques-
tions, thereafter he viewed his role as:  
‘to try to keep us to time, which is sometimes diffi-
cult; to keep to the strategy; and when somebody 
has a smart idea, to make sure they catch my eye 
and they interject…So once the system is rolling, 
the most successful session is, in a sense, the one 
where I am totally quiet, because it’s all gone to 
plan and the right information has come out.’ (in-
terview, July 4, 2011) 
In this conception of leadership, attention is not pri-
marily focused on the chair at all, at least not during 
evidence sessions, where the chair acts largely as a fa-
cilitator and enabler for other committee members. 
That does not mean the role is marginal. This chair was 
clear that ‘the one thing you cannot do as chair is busk, 
and when you go the meetings, you’ve got to know 
what’s going on’ (interview, July 4, 2011). The chair’s 
ability to focus and ‘allocate attention purposefully’ (’t 
Hart, 2014, p. 40) is regarded as a key leadership skill 
(Goleman, 2013), and is thus essential for the commit-
tee’s strategic success and the delivery of inquiry goals.  
4.2. Defining and Contesting Leadership and 
Followership in Select Committees 
While this article argues that political leadership is 
clearly identifiable in the actions and strategies of se-
lect committee chairs, a key question posed by the re-
search was whether chairs themselves would describe 
what they do as leadership. The interviewees ex-
pressed differing opinions on this point, which offer 
compelling insights into the chair role specifically and 
the contingencies of political leadership generally, but 
also into the beliefs of actors about whether ‘leader-
ship’ was an appropriate way to describe what they do. 
One chair was clear that: 
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‘It is a leadership role. It’s similar to the skipper of 
any team. You’ve got to keep people focused on the 
job in hand, occasionally deal with details that pro-
hibit them [being involved]…and just make sure 
that all of them have got the opportunity to engage 
fully.’ (interview, July 4, 2011, interviewee’s em-
phasis) 
Another chair agreed that ‘there is a leadership role’ 
(interviewee’s emphasis), and connected this not only 
to the broad programme of work undertaken by a 
committee, but also to the chair role in terms of man-
aging the inquiry report-writing process, media rela-
tionships, and interactions with external stakeholders, 
‘where you do lead in those senses’ (interview, De-
cember 4, 2012). One chair explained his committee 
chair role in terms of ‘providing leadership in the 
committee, and to be the external face of the commit-
tee’, emphasising the public visibility that he believed 
committee members accepted, and in some cases ex-
pected, as a fundamental aspect of the role (interview, 
July 12, 2012). Nye’s (2008) soft power of communica-
tion is thus a vital part of the chair leadership toolkit: 
the chair is the public face of the committee, particu-
larly in the news media, and must be able effectively to 
articulate the arguments made by the committee in in-
quiry reports.  
The election of committee chairs was also identified 
as a key resource which imbued chairs with leadership 
potential. For example, one chair agreed that he acted 
in a leadership capacity, and explained that this capaci-
ty ‘has got nothing to do with my status, seniority, age 
or anything else…I have been elected to do the job, I’m 
paid to do the job…and I give more of my time and my 
commitment than any other committee member as a 
consequence’ (interview, July 12, 2012).  
Yet, elected status was nevertheless contingent. 
Another seasoned chair reflected that: 
‘I wouldn’t put a label around my neck saying ‘I am 
the leader’, because they [the committee mem-
bers] might feel you need taking down a peg in that 
case.’ (interview, July 14, 2011) 
Thus, leadership is not to be brandished, even when 
one is elected. Yet, this same chair continued:  
‘But it is a leadership role. And actually committee 
members do look at you in that way, and expect 
you to show leadership to them. They will come 
with different and often conflicting ideas, and as 
with any leader, although it might not have been 
my first thought, my sense is that we will go with 
that if there’s enough support and interest. But at 
other times, you might need to make the commit-
tee realise that there’s something they’ve got to do 
which shouldn’t be neglected, and that’s a leader-
ship role. They [the committee members] also ex-
pect you to fight on their behalf.’ (interview, July 
14, 2011) 
One chair gave a particularly insightful description of 
her chair role, and its dynamic dependence on the rest 
of the committee membership, when she explained 
that: 
‘I’m a leader, but I’m very conscious that I’m in the 
hands of the committee, and I have to keep their 
confidence, and have their agreement on what I’m 
doing, or we would have a very divided committee, 
and that would damage it’s work.’ (interview, June 
20, 2011) 
It may seem obvious enough that leaders can only lead 
if they have the support of those with whom they 
work, but the broader partisan political context in 
which select committees operate makes this especially 
salient. This same chair gave an example from an in-
quiry during which she had been highly critical of a 
government minister, and where ‘the committee sup-
ported me in that criticism’ (interview, June 20, 2011). 
She reported bringing the committee together for the 
purpose of securing their agreement in advance of is-
suing her highly critical comments, precisely because 
she needed the committee to maintain a position of 
consensus for her criticism as chair to have any value. 
As a member of the opposition party, she explained, it 
was especially important for her to ensure that the 
governing party MPs on the committee would agree to 
this course of action. In this instance, as in so many 
others affecting select committee work, consensus is 
king, actors are interdependent, and collaborative and 
adaptive political leadership is key. 
One chair from the government side explained that, 
when he originally sought election to his committee 
chair, he made it clear to MPs: 
‘that I wasn’t interested in being a chair that simply 
sat on the side-lines and offered some kind of run-
ning commentary. What I wanted to do was to en-
gage the select committee, real time, in the policy 
making process.’ (interview, May 24, 2011) 
He believed that direct election had helped him fulfil 
his more expansive role for the chair, but was nonethe-
less hesitant about describing himself as a ‘leader’, of-
fering the word ‘catalyst’ instead (interview, May 24, 
2011). When pressed on why ‘leader’ was an unsuita-
ble term, he responded that, ‘it implies that others are 
followers, and that’s not necessarily how Members of 
Parliament like to see themselves.’ This captures the 
dilemmas at the heart of the leader-follower debate, 
and the frequent unease surrounding the applicability 
of the notion of followership as an essential compo-
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nent of leadership in the world of political elites. And 
this view was not isolated. Another chair similarly re-
jected the idea that she was a leader of her committee, 
saying she ‘would rather be the facilitator…than leader’ 
(interview, July 6, 2011). Yet her description of her role 
mirrored that of another chair who fully accepted the 
leadership label, even down to the detail of explaining 
that a good committee chair doing a good job tends 
not to be noticed by their members during inquiry ses-
sions. Similarly, she argued that the extent to which 
the chair could ‘set the tone’ of a committee, and ‘en-
courage everyone to contribute’ was the determining 
factor ‘in whether you’ve got a functioning select 
committee or a dysfunctional one’ (interview, July 6, 
2011). The fact that two senior committee chairs could 
both use such similar language to describe the role and 
importance of the chair, but then take differing views 
on whether that role constitutes leadership, reveals 
much about the nature of interactions inside select 
committee environments, the particular political con-
text of committees, and also hesitation over whether 
MPs might conceptualise committee chair roles given 
that their primary leadership touchstones will be those 
at the top of their own parliamentary parties. 
5. Conclusions: Parliamentary Committee Leadership 
in Perspective 
House of Commons select committee chairs are in-
creasingly important actors in the successful delivery of 
parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. They are piv-
otal in enabling committees to function effectively, and 
in facilitating an environment where collegiate working 
can result in consensus report production in the con-
text of a broader institutional setting where adversarial 
parliamentary politics are the defining feature of the 
party battle. In exploring the leadership dynamics of 
the select committee chair role, this article advances 
both our conceptualisations of these particular political 
actors and our understanding of the everyday leader-
ship practices they deploy. The collaborative leadership 
frame and the chair interviews together illustrate just 
how complex the chair role is, as evidenced by the 
range of leadership tools and resources which chairs 
develop and deploy in order to manage that complexi-
ty. The interviews also provide compelling empirical ev-
idence of the tensions inherent in leadership-
followership dynamics in contemporary political con-
texts. Some concluding remarks usefully illuminate the 
landscape for future research. 
First, the shift inside the House of Commons to-
wards elected select committee chairs has facilitated 
their emergence as significant and resourceful parlia-
mentary actors. With their connective tissue to the 
party business managers largely severed, at least as far 
as their institutional positioning is concerned, chairs 
evidently now utilise their democratic legitimacy not 
just as a scrutiny tool, but also as a leadership re-
source. They are empowered in ways they never were 
before, and this makes the analysis of their roles all the 
richer. There is valuable work to be done in analysing 
how this role continues to change in the future.  
Second, chairs are ultimately responsible for mak-
ing their committees function as effective scrutiny ve-
hicles. This means they must foster collegiality amongst 
MPs who naturally bring different party perspectives to 
bear on committee policy inquiries, and may be serving 
on the committee for many different reasons, not all of 
which will involve notions of advancing the public good 
through parliamentary scrutiny. That committees com-
prise elite politicians with different views on the com-
mittee’s rightful focus (in terms of policy orientation, 
evidence base, approach to ministerial questioning, 
etc.) and also with different motivations for involve-
ment (political advancement, policy advocacy, back-
bench ‘make-work’, etc.), consequently involves chairs 
exhibiting a range of leadership skills and strategies in 
order to advance committee goals. Exploring how 
chairs perform these tasks and successfully (or unsuc-
cessfully) deliver useful scrutiny outputs provides a 
compelling insight into how actors operate in complex 
institutional contexts where actors possess competing 
loyalties. Crucially, it also affords an insight into how 
those actors behave as leaders in an environment 
where all MPs on a committee are already members of 
the political elite, and already acknowledge political 
(party) leadership through other channels. 
Third, this work maps new terrain by analysing par-
liament from a fresh perspective. While questions 
about internal organization and processes, legislative 
management, scrutiny and oversight capacity, execu-
tive-legislative relations, and so on, are all obviously 
important avenues for exploration, this article provides 
a new lens on their analysis by employing ideas about 
political leadership in the parliamentary context. Ap-
plying this perspective to the role of select committee 
chair, a crucially positioned institutional actor, not only 
helps us better understand how these committees are 
organized and function, but also begins the process of 
mapping what it means to be a parliamentary political 
leader outside the framework of parliamentary party 
leadership. Conceiving of select committee chairs as 
political leaders inside parliament can thus reposition 
our understanding of chairs while also providing empir-
ical insights that enrich our academic perspectives on 
contemporary political leadership. In particular, the 
specific features of select committee membership af-
ford opportunities to explore the contested and con-
troversial idea of followership, which the interview ev-
idence presented here demonstrates is a slippery 
concept when applied to political elites in these par-
liamentary committee contexts.  
Finally, the article shows that leadership analyses 
can go beyond studies of presidents, prime ministers, 
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and party leaders, in order to examine more lowly po-
litical figures who may not automatically spring to mind 
in the context of political leadership, but who are 
nonetheless performing important leadership roles in a 
system of dispersed democratic governance. Future 
development of these concepts and ideas can there-
fore expand our understanding of what political lead-
ership is and does, the diverse institutional contexts in 
which we find it, and how actors themselves under-
stand leadership and practice it in their everyday politi-
cal life.  
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